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Case Comments
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy: Traditional,
Single-Test Approach Rejected in Favor of Decision
Based Upon Underlying Policies and Balancing of Interests
Defendant struck and injured two policemen with his auto-
mobile in evading their roadblock, at the same time colliding
twice with the roadblock car. Following the pursuit and appre-
hension, defendant was charged and convicted of reckless driving
and leaving the scene of an accident. Later he was tried and
convicted on two counts of atrocious assault. Both convictions
were affirmed on appeal. In sustaining the Appellate Division,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the conviction for reck-
less driving and leaving the scene of an accident did not bar, on
principles of double jeopardy, subsequent prosecution for atro-
cious assault arising out of the same incident. State v. Currie, 41
N.J. 531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964).'
Most state constitutions, like the federal constitution, provide
that a defendant may be prosecuted or punished no more than
once for the same offense? The purpose of these prohibitions
includes (1) avoidance of excessive punishment for a single cul-
pable act, (2) economy of judicial time and money through con-
solidation of prosecutions, (3) establishment of the finality of one
prosecution, and (4) protection of defendants from repeated or
continual prosecutions
The problem in applying the double jeopardy clause has been
the difficulty in determining which violations constitute the "same
1. The first conviction, obtained before a municipal court having no juris-
diction over atrocious assault, NJ. Rnv. STAT. H§ SA:8-21 (1951), 2A:8-22
(Supp. 1968), was affirmed on de novo trial before the county court and
defendant was fined $25 plus $100 costs. The second conviction was before
the county court, which had no original jurisdiction over reckless driving.
N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:8-4, 9A:3-6 (1951). It was affirmed per curiam by the
appellate division. Under this conviction, defendant was sentenced to two-to-
three years imprisonment.
2. Instant case at 586, 197 A.2d at 681 (1964).
3. See Note, 65 YALE LJ. 339-41 (1956). See also Bigelow, Former Con-
viction and Former Acquittal, 11 RuTGERs L. REV. 487 (1957); Knowlton,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 11 RuTGERs L. REv. 71, 91 (1956); Lugar, Crim-
inal Law, Double Jeopardy, and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317, 345-47
(1954).
CASE COMMENT
offense." 4 Some courts, including those of New Jersey, employ a
"same transaction" test, which bars multiple prosecutions and
punishments for offenses arising out of the same act or "trans-
action." A majority, however, relies on a "same evidence" rule,"
under which a second prosecution is barred if defendant could
have been convicted at the first trial by proof of facts necessary
to convict at the second." Similar to the same evidence rule is
4. This problem has become increasingly serious with the multiplication
of criminal statutes. Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1960); Note, 65 YALE L.J. 339,
341-44 (1956).
5. Haraway v. State, 22 Ala. App. 553, 117 So. 612 (Ct. App. 1928) (if act
violates several statutes, state must elect violation to prosecute). See also
Commonwealth v. Gill, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 879, 90 S.W. 605 (Ct. App. 1906)
(breach of peace conviction barred assault and battery prosecution); State v.
Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 At. 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919), 4 A.L.R. 695
(conviction of robbery barred prosecution for murder resulting therefrom);
Lugar, supra note 3, at 325, 345-47.
Some cases applying this test have attached significance to whether one
of the charges is included within the other or is a "constituent" of the other.
Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1930); State v. Hill, 44
N.J. Super. 110, 129 A.2d 752 (App. Div. 1957) (robbery; assault with intent
to rob). And, an offense may be deemed included although there could be
no conviction of it at the second prosecution. Territory v. Silva, 27 Hawaii
270 (1923) (assault and battery conviction barred prosecution for rape); State
v. Labato, 7 NJ. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951) (disorderly person conviction before
magistrate barred harboring lottery papers prosecution). See Kirchheimer,
The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949).
Some states have incorporated the same transaction rule by statute. See
CAL. PEN. CODE § 654; Mu. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (1964); N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 1938. The rule is also incorporated, with minor qualifications, in MODEL
PENAL CODE, §§ 1.07, 1.09(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Related to the same transaction rule is the little-used test based on
whether the defendant had a single motivating criminal intent. See, e.g.,
Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 219 S.W.2d 625 (1949); People v. De Sisto, 27
Misc. 2d 217, 214 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Kings County Ct. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds sub nwm. People v. Lo Cicero, 17 App. Div. 2d 31, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 384
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Note, 47 MINN. L. REv. 255, 276-77 (1962).
6. The federal courts have in the past applied the same evidence rule,
but it now appears that the Justice Department favors the same transaction
test. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
7. The major difficulty with this approach lies in determining the necessary
quantum and elements of proof. Three viewpoints as to necessary facts prevail:
(1) evidence that will actually be presented at the second trial, e.g., Nielson,
131 U.S. 176 (1889) (cohabitation prosecution -barred subsequent adultery
prosecution); United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959) (selling
heroin without a written order; selling illegally imported heroin); (2) eviden-
tiary facts listed in the indictment, e.g., State v. Mark, 23 N.J. 162, 128 A.2d
487 (1957) (disorderly person prosecution barred possession of obscene matter
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one variety of the "additional fact" test, under which there is
no double jeopardy if conviction of each offense requires proof
of a fact that the other does not. A second type of additional
fact test confers considerably narrower protection - double
jeopardy will not be found if conviction for either offense requires
proof of a fact that the other does not.P
The problem is further complicated by a number of recognized
exceptions to the mechanical tests, permitting multiple prosecu-
tions and punishments otherwise prohibited. Additional prosecu-
tion or punishment has been allowed if the first court had no
jurisdiction to convict for the crime charged in the second prose-
cution, if the second prosecution was for a criminal offense while
the first was for a noncriminal infraction, or if the existence of
separate criminal statutes is viewed as a legislative fiat enabling
a single act to constitute multiple offenses.10 Other exceptions
prosecution); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 127, 80 A.2d 617 (1951) (disorderly per-
son; harboring lottery papers); Commonwealth v. Bergen, 184 Pa. Super. 62,
4 A.2d 164 (1939) (reckless driving did not bar manslaughter- indictment
failed to specify manslaughter caused by automobile); (8) facts which must
be alleged in an indictment for the crime charged (under this reasoning a
conviction of reckless driving does not preclude prosecution for manslaughter,
because manslaughter can be committed by means other than reckless driving,
even though the state will have to prove defendant's reckless driving in the
actual case), People v. Herbert, 6 Cal. 2d 541, 58 P.2d 909 (1986); State v.
Midgett, 214 N.C. 107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938). On these three viewpoints gen-
erally, see Note, 40 YALE L.J. 462 (1931).
8. E.g., Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964) (possession
of unregistered firearm; possession of firearm with manufacturing tax unpaid);
State v. Lawrence, 146 Me. 360, 82 A.2d 90 (1951) (driving under influence;
being found drunk in public place); State v. Leibowitz, 22 N.J. 102, 123 A.2d
526 (1956) (assault with intent to kill with firearm; unlawfully concealing fire-
arm). Unlike the same evidence rule, this additional fact test provides protec-
tion where defendant is prosecuted first for the greater offense and later for
the lesser one. For example, had the defendant in Currie been tried first for
atrocious assault, the same evidence test would not bar a later prosecution
for reckless driving, because proof of facts necessary to convict for reckless
driving would not establish the offense of atrocious assault. But the additional
fact test would bar the reckless driving prosecution, since proof of that offense
involves no facts in addition to those charged in the atrocious assault
indictments.
9. E.g., State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 333, 94 A.2d 493 (1953) (reckless
driving did not bar causing death by reckless driving); State v. Williams, 21
N.J. Misc. 329, 34 A.2d 141 (Recorder's Ct. 1943) (alternate holding) (driving
without license; driving after revocation of license); State v. Empey, 65 Utah
609, 239 Pac. 25 (1925) (reckless driving; manslaughter).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 288 Mass. 150, 192 N.E. 522 (1934)
(no jurisdiction, legislative fiat); People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183
N.W. 177 (1921) (no jurisdiction); State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d
604 (1950) (no jurisdiction, noncriminal); State v. Shoopman, mspra note 9
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have been made where the victim has, since defendant's first trial,
died due to defendant's wrongdoing," and where the act is an
offense against different jurisdictions.2
Defining the scope of constitutional "sameness" by using any
single test has consistently proved unsatisfactory both in terms
of the factors evaluated and the results reached. A particular
offense may be factually distinguished from or classified the
"same" as another on the basis of a variety of equally descrip-
tive characteristics, such as motivational, evidentiary, and fac-
tual. The single-test approaches, therefore, in focusing on only
one factor, seem unjustifiably narrow. In addition, the use of any
single test forecloses consideration of the fundamental competing
policy objectives underlying the safeguard. To avoid this some
jurisdictions apply contradictory standards, 3 choosing whichever
rule dictates the desired result, apparently predetermined on
other unannounced grounds. Furthermore, reliance on these super-
ficial tests often produces unpredictable and inconsistent results
because of ambiguities and intricacies in determining whether
offenses are part of the same transaction or possess the requisite
evidentiary similarities.'
(all three exceptions). Contra, State v. Pennsylvania R.R., 9 N.J. 194, 87 A.2d
709 (1952) (legislative fiat); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 187, 80 A.2d 617 (1951)
(quasi-criminal); Note, 24 Mum. L. REV. 522, 544-45 (1940) (no jurisdiction).
11. Territory v. Nihipali, 40 Hawaii 331 (1953).
12. This exception is most familiarly applied to successive prosecutions
for state and federal offenses. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959). But it has also been applied to conduct which violates both a municipal
ordinance and a state law. See, e.g., State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d
604 (1950); State v. Reid, 19 N.J. Super. 82, 87 A.2d 562 (Essex County Ct.
1952).
13. State v. Leibowitz, 22 N.J. 102, 123 A.2d 526 (1956), applied the
additional-fact-required-for-each-prosecution rule. That test is inconsistent
with New Jersey's same transaction rule. See New Jersey cases cited supra
note 5. The New Jersey cases cited supra note 9 apply the additional-fact-
required-for-either-prosecution rule, which contradicts both of the above rules.
Thus, New Jersey has applied three logically inconsistent rules. See Note, 7
BnooKLYN L. REv. 79, 81 (1937).
14. Courts' views of transactions vary widely. In State v. Willhite, 40
N.J. Super. 405, 123 A.2d 237 (Morris County Ct. 1956), the court held
defendant's journey through three local jurisdictions constituted a single
transaction of reckless driving. However, in Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284
S.W.2d 654 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955), defendant's commission of assault and bat-
tery with his automobile was found to be a separate transaction from his
reckless driving. One court found a conviction of breach of the peace barred
prosecution for assault and battery. Commonwealth v. Gill, 28 Ky. L. Rep.
879, 90 S.W. 605 (Ct. App. 1906). Another held a conviction of disturbing a
religious meeting (by an attempted shooting) did not bar an attempted mur-
der prosecution. State v. Ross, 72 Tenn. (4 Lea) 442 (1880).
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The Currie court recognized the futility of employing a single
test of sameness." It sought instead to accommodate the under-
lying policies of the double jeopardy prohibition, and the state's
interest in punishing criminal conduct commensurate with culpa-
bility." Both offenses stemmed from the act of driving and sub-
sequent collisions with the roadblock car, and no doubt the
collisions were considered by the magistrate in the reckless driving
conviction. Thus a liberal view of constitutional sameness would
support a finding that the second conviction constituted double
jeopardy. By forcing a consolidation of the state's prosecutions,
judicial energy would be conserved and defendants would avoid
the oppression of repeated prosecutions.'1 However, motor vehicle
Difficulties also apparently exist in applying the test based upon whether
the defendant was motivated by a single criminal intent. See note 5 supra. In
People v. De Sisto, 27 Misc. 2d 217, 214 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Kings County Ct.
1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. People v. Lo Cicero, 17 App. Div. 2d
31, 280 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where the defendant kept the victim
captive in a truck to facilitate hijacking it, the court found the kidnapping
and robbery to be motivated by the same intent. Compare Holder v. Fraser,
215 Ark. 67, 219 S.W.2d 625 (1949), in which the court found separate crim-
inal intents for the death of each of two victims simultaneously killed by
defendant's reckless driving.
15. The court pointed to State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956),
aff'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), as being exemplary of the tests' inadequacies.
16. 41 N.J. at 538, 539, 197 A.ed at 682, 683.
Some cases indicate an unarticulated consideration of the interest in ap-
propriate punishment. See, e.g., State v. Hoag, supra note 15, at 506, 122 A.2d
at 633. One of the few cases openly considering this factor is State v. Simmons,
48 Del. (9 Terry) 166, 169, 99 A.2d 401, 403 (Super. Ct. 1953). Other courts
apparently have not considered appropriate punishment to be an overriding
consideration. See, e.g., United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959),
holding double jeopardy bars a prosecution for selling illegally imported
heroin subsequent to a prosecution for selling heroin without a written order,
even though the first conviction carried no penalty because of an inadvertent
mistake in the statute. See also State v. Greely, 30 N.J. Super. 180, 191, 103
A.2d 639, 645 (Hudson County Ct. 1954).
Concern for appropriate punishment is indicated by the line of cases
permitting a second prosecution for conduct already the subject of a criminal
conviction where the victim dies as a result of the offense, after the first
prosecution. See, e.g., Territory v. Nihipali, 40 Hawaii 331 (1953); State v.
Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d 913 (1940); Hill v. State, 141 Tex. Crim.
169, 149 S.W.2d 93, aff'd, 144 Tex. Crim. 57, 161 S.W.2d 80 (1941).
17. See Lugar, supra note 3, at 345; Note, 24 Mnw. L. REV. 522, 545-46
(1940).
Prior to Currie the New Jersey courts have twice rejected the argument
that, notwithstanding identity of offenses, a second prosecution is justified
because of difficulties in local-state coordination. State v. Mark, 23 N.J. 162,
168, 128 A.2d 487, 490 (1957); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 151, 80 A.2d 617,
-624 (1951).
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regulations are enforced by summary proceedings and minor
penalties are designed to punish conduct very different from that
necessary to support a conviction for an intentional criminal
act." The difficulties inherent in requiring coordination among
state, county, and local prosecuting authorities in acting on multi-
ple violations arising from operation of a vehicle would seem to
outweigh the inconvenience of separate trials to the defendant."
Furthermore, prohibiting a prosecution for the criminal conduct
because of the prosecution for a traffic violation, carrying only
a small fine, would not accord with the defendant's reasonable
expectations and would adversely affect the state's law enforce-
ment function.2 o
The New Jersey State Bar Association, fearing that the trend toward
"finespun distinctions" found in State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 333, 94 A.2d 493
(1953), would nullify the double jeopardy safeguard, recommended magistrate-
prosecutor coordination. The suggested legislation authorized and required a
magistrate, upon request of the prosecutor, to stay his proceedings for a limited
period in order that a grand jury could consider the matter. If an indictment
were returned, the magistrate proceedings would then be dismissed. 77 N.J.LJ.
408 (1954).
See also the Justice Department Press Release, in New York Times, April
6, 1959, p. 19, col. 2, announcing a Department policy against prosecuting if
a state already has done so.
18. The court's reliance on State v. Shoopman, supra note 17, might
possibly indicate that double jeopardy is never a defense to a prosecution
subsequent to a motor vehicle violation proceeding. However, Shoopman has
been criticized. Knowlton, supra note 3, at 78, 89; 21 FORDHAwI L. REv. 296
(1952); 77 N.J.L.J. 408 (1954) (bar association comment); 8 RUTGERS L. REV.
413 (1953). State v. Albertalli, 112 Atl. 724 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1915), and State v.
Williams, 21 N.J. Mise. 329, 34 A.2d 141 (Recorder's Ct. 1943), cited by the
instant court, may also be read as indicating that double jeopardy is never
a defense in this context. The Currie court's multifaceted analysis, however,
leads to the conclusion that a second prosecution would be barred at least
when the criminal charge was substantially the same as the vehicle conviction.
See State v. Francis, 67 N.J. Super. 377, 381, 170 A.2d 476, 478 (App. Div.
1961); State v. Willhite, 40 N.J. Super. 405, 123 A.2d 237 (Morris County Ct.
1956); cf. State v. Berry, 41 N.J. 547, 197 A.2d 687 (1964).
19. Cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959), in which the
Court said "it would be highly impractical for the federal authorities to at-
tempt to keep informed of all state prosecutions which might bear on federal
offenses." The Court's concern appears to apply equally to law enforcement
coordination among local, county, and state officials.
20. 41 N.J. at 545, 197 A.2d at 685-86. Further support for the
court's conclusion was apparently found in the extreme dissimilarity between
penalties and "reasonable expectations" as to the gravity of the criminal
charge compared with the vehicle violations. See N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:4-96
(Supp. 1958) which provides up to 60 days imprisonment or up to $200 or both
for the first conviction for reckless driving. See also N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:4-199
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Since the Currie result is not novel,2 1 the significance of the
case lies in its analytically sound and helpful approach. 2 By
rejecting complete reliance on a single test," while recognizing the
(Supp. 1941) which authorizes a penalty for leaving the scene of an accident
of up to six months or up to $500 or both for subsequent convictions. Com-
pare NJ. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:85-6, 2A:90-1 (1951), which provide a penalty of
up to $2,000 or up to seven years or both for atrocious assault and battery.
21. Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955), and
State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (1950), were the only cases dis-
covered in which assault was prosecuted subsequent to reckless driving. Both
found double jeopardy was no bar. Several cases hold that a reckless driving
conviction does not bar a homicide prosecution. E.g., Bacom v. Sullivan, 200
F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910 (1953); People v. Herbert,
6 Cal. 2d 541, 58 P.2d 909 (1936); State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So. 2d 744
(1947); State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 Pac. 25 (1925); see Annot., 172 A.L.R.
1053 (1948). But of. Territory v. Nihipali, 40 Hawaii 331 (1953). Although
the court in Nihipali upheld a negligent homicide conviction subsequent to
a reckless driving prosecution, it intimated that the homicide prosecution
would have been barred had the victim been dead at the time of defendant's
reckless driving conviction.
22. See Note, 24 Muor. L. REV. 522, 562 (1940). But see 11 ORLA. L. REv.
318, 320 (1958).
2S. Under the same transaction test as liberally applied in previous New
Jersey cases, the defendant would have prevailed. See, e.g., State v. Mowser,
92 N.J.L. 474, 106 Atl. 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919) (murder and robbery);
State v. Willhite, 40 N.J. Super. 405, 123 A.2d 237 (Morris County Ct. 1956)
(reckless driving in three different jurisdictions). This same attitude would
undoubtedly view assault with an automobile as part of the transaction of
reckless driving. But see Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1955).
Also, under the same evidence rule it is likely that double jeopardy would
have been found to bar the action since proof of the evidentiary facts in the
indictments- atrocious assault committed "with a motor vehicle then and
there being operated by defendant" -would be ample to convict defendant
of reckless driving.
Since the MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962) is merely
an amalgam of the widely used tests, it appears from the facts of this case
to be analytically capable of supporting opposite results. Arguably, however,
defendant would prevail under that Code. Section 1.07 provides:
(1) . . . . He may not, however, be convicted of more than one
offense if:
(a) one offense is included in the other, as defined in Subsection
(4) ...
(4) . ... An offense is so included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged . ...
Section 1.09 provides:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of
the statutes than a former prosecution or based on different facts, it is
744
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relevance of each, the court was able to consider all appropriate
facets of sameness. The Currie analysis focuses attention on the
principles underlying the double jeopardy prohibition and the
competing policies in a given factual situation. This emphasis
provides a generally applicable analytical framework, assures
that fundamental policy objectives will be considered, and may
enhance the predictability of results.
Corporations: Dominant Shareholder in Close
Corporation Allowed To Vote Without Regard to
Interests of the Corporation
Complainant, a director and stockholder in a close family
corporation, challenged a vote of the majority stockholders re-
fusing shares offered to the corporation pursuant to a first option
provision.' Complainant's stepmother, a second director, con-
trolled the corporation by virtue of a life interest in approximately
80 percent of the outstanding stock. Upon her death the shares
barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) . . . the subsequent prosecution is for:
(c) the same conduct, unless (i) the offense of which the defendant
was formerly convicted or subsequently prosecuted each requires proof
of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil
Under § 1.07, arguably the offense of reckless driving is included within the
charge of atrocious assault because it could be established by proof of the
facts "required to establish" the atrocious assault. Here, just as in the same
evidence test, however, difficulty lies in determining which facts are required
to establish the including offense. See note 7 supra. Depending on the view
chosen as to required proof, opposite results could be reached.
Assuming both offenses were committed by the same conduct, § 1.09
would bar the atrocious assault prosecution unless each offense "requires proof
of a fact not required by the other." Here again opposite results can be
reached depending on how the evidentiary problems noted above and in note
7 supra are resolved.
1. The option provided that any shareholder desiring to sell stock must
first offer it to the corporation which may then purchase within one month
from the time of the offer. Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d 231, 23 (R.I. 1964). Such
provisions are universally held to be for the benefit of the corporation and
therefore valid. See 48 Mminx. L. REV. 808 (1964). First options are designed
to allow the original shareholders to control the entry of new shareholders
and to protect their proportionate interest in the corporation. For extensive
discussion of first option provisions, see 2 O'NEAL, CLosE CORPORATIONS H§
7.02-.29 (1958).
